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ELECTRONICALLY STORED EVIDENCE: ANSWERS
TO SOME RECURRING QUESTIONS CONCERNING
PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND TRIAL USAGEt
RICHARD ALLAN HORNING*

The use of increasingly sophisticated and complex electronic data pro-

cessing systems for business information storage and management is
widespread. Computers, relying as they do on "invisible" electronic impulses

contained in compact storage devices such as tape drives, disk drives, and
"bubble memories,"

are rapidly overtaking filing cabinets as the chief

repositories for business statistics and vital business information. As long ago
as 1973 the Missouri Supreme Court observed that "[lt is common
knowledge, which a court need not ignore, that computerized record keeping

is rapidly becoming a normal procedure in the business world."I According to
a recent article in Business Week, sales of computer hardware in the United
States have risen from $12 billion in 1979 to an estimated $32 billion in 1984,
while sales of computer software packages have risen from $200 million to an
estimated $10 billionin the same period.' In this environment it is not surprising that electronically stored evidence might be involved in even gardenvariety business litigation.
Consider a hypothetical case involving ABA Distributors, a plumbing
products distributor, which asserts breach of contract claims against a supplier named Round-The-Bend.3 ABA Distributors has annual gross sales of
all products of $150 million. ABA Distributors uses order entry computer terminals at its four sales offices to process sales orders received at those branch

+ Copyright @ Richard Allan Horning. All rights reserved (except as otherwise provided
in the

STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP AND CIRCULATION).

* Member of the California Bar. B.A. 1966, University of California; J.D. 1969, Duke
University School of Law. The author wishes to thank Ms. Cathryn A. Christy, Christy & Associates, Mill Valley, California, and J. Montgomery Kersten, Esq., Associate General Counsel,
Tandem Computers, Inc., Cupertino, California, for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of
this article.
I. See Union Elec. Co. v. Mansion House Center N. Redev. Co., 494 S.W.2d 309, 315
(Mo. Sup. Ct. 1973).
2. Software: The New Driving Force, Bus. WK., Feb. 27, 1984, at 74-75.
3. This hypothetical was developed for use in connection with a program presented at the
American Bar Association Litigation Section Fall meeting in Chicago, Illinois in November of
1982. The author of this article was one of the panelists on the program and participated in the
development of this hypothetical. The program outline and resource materials were published by
the American Bar Association Litigation Section. See The Discovery and Use of Computer Based
Evidence, (A. Silverman ed. 1982) (handout distributed at Fall 1982 ABA Litigation Section
meeting) [hereinafter cited as ABA COMPUTER EVIDENCE PROGRAM]. An audio tape of the program presentation and panel discussion is available from the American Bar Association, Chicago,
Illinois.
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offices. 4 The remotely located terminals are linked telephonically via a
modem to ABA's mainframe computer housed at ABA's headquarters. The
order entry terminals print out an invoice furnished to ABA's customers
showing ABA's product number (which is coded to yeild the identity of
ABA's supplier), units sold, sales price, total purchase price, sales tax computation, shipped to an billed to data, and other pertinent information. The
sales data input by the sales clerk into the remote terminal is electronically
stored in the terminal for subsequent transmission over the telephone lines to
ABA's mainframe. The back-up paper copies ("hard copies") of the sales invoices are filed away for temporary reference at the branch office and are
later sent to ABA's headquarters for audit use and permanent storage. The
electronically captured sales data transmitted to ABA's mainframe is stored
on hard disk (with daily tape back-up) until the end of the current accounting
period, at which point it is transferred to magnetic tape. The data stored on
hard disk and on magnetic tape is accessed and manipulated periodically by
ABA's computer staff to generate printouts containing periodic sales data,
product reordering information, budget versus actual comparisons, short
term profit projections, and similar business statistics. The sales data is also
integrated into ABA's financial reporting system.
ABA's supplier, Round-The-Bend, allegedly breached its distributorship
agreement with ABA by appointing a second distributor in ABA's otherwise
exclusive area. Counsel for Round-The-Bend anticipates that at trial ABA
will attempt to prove its damages by offering first, a series of computer printouts, generated on a quarterly basis from 1975 to September 1982, to prove
ABA's historic sales of Round-The-Bend's product; second, a second set of
computer printouts containing projections of lost future sales of Round-TheBend products and the profits which would have been realized therefrom
through 1990, generated from ABA's historic sales data by a special regression analysis program developed by ABA's data processing manager, Ms.
Joyce Davenport; and third, testimony by the president of ABA, Mr. Hardly
Everwright, that the computer printouts generated by Ms. Davenport's
special program measure ABA's damages.
The ABA hypothetical presents a situation where pretrial discovery of
both the hard copy of ABA's sales records and the electronically stored sales
data is essential if Round-The-Bend's counsel is to challenge effectively the
admissibility and accuracy of the computer printouts. Counsel for RoundThe-Bend will also need access to ABA's sales information, profit and loss
data, budgets, sales projections, and ABA's computer programs (including
Ms. Davenport's special program) in order to prepare alternate damage

4. For a description of the workings of ABA's computer system and of the components of
computer hardware and software which make up ABA's computer system, see C. Christy, Introduction to a Business Computer System, in ABA COMPUTER EVIDENCE PROGRAM, supra note 3.
See generally Singer, ProposedChanges to the FederalRules of EvidenceasApplied to ComputerGeneratedEvidence, 7 J. COMPUTER TECH. L. 157 (1979).
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studies and effectively cross-examine Mr. Everwright on the damage issue.
Several questions will occur immediately to Round-The-Bend's counsel.
Are the tapes and disk containing the electronically stored sales data
discoverable in addition to hard copies of the invoices containing the same information? To what extent can Round-The-Bend's counsel secure courtordered assistance from ABA in understanding ABA's computer programs,
identifying the pertinent data, and manipulating the electronically stored information? If ABA produces the sales data in hard copy, will a court order
ABA to furnish the same information in electronic form to
Round-The-Bend's counsel upon appropriate motion? Will the court allow
Round-The-Bend's counsel to obtain discovery of the details of Ms. Davenport's special computer program and supporting documentation even though
Ms. Davenport will not be a trial witness? Are the printouts admissible and is
so, what are the standards for their admissibility? If counsel for Round-TheBend or ABA includes the sales data in a litigation support computer system,
is opposing counsel entitled to discovery access to that litigation support
system? This article will focus on these questions, which recur in business
litigation involving electronically stored evidence.
DISCOVERABILITY OF
ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION
Before 1970 it was unclear whether records stored in electronic media,
such as the magnetic tapes and hard disks containing ABA's sales data, were
subject to the production requirements of the discovery rules. 5 Rule 34 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was amended in 1970 to make it clear that
electronically stored information fell within the ambit of Rule 34's production
and inspection procedures. 6 The Rule now explicitly allows discovery of
"data compliations from which information can be obtained, and translated
if necessary, by the respondent through detection devices into reasonably
7
usable form."
Statutes dealing with recording keeping and governmental inspection of
records have also been interpreted as covering electronically stored data. In
United States v. Davey8 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) served a summons
5. United States v. Davey, 543 F.2d 996, 999 (2d Cir. 1976) (court found no authority prior
to amendment of Rule 34 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure holding that computer tapes were
not discoverable under Rule 34), modifying 404 F. Supp. 1283 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a). The Advisory Committee specifically noted that "the inclusive
description of 'documents' is revised to accord with changing technology. [The amended Rule]
makes clear that Rule 34 applies to electronic data compilations from which information can be
obtained only with the use of detection devices .. " FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a) advisory committee
note, reprintedin 48 F.R.D. 487, 527 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Advisory Committee Statement] In United States v. Davey, the Second Circuit stated that the 1970 amendment to Rule 34
"was merely intended to clarify the scope of the Rule, not to change it." United States v. Davey,
543 F.2d 996, 999 (2d Cir. 1976).

7. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a).
8. 404 F. Supp. 1283 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), modified, 543 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1976).
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on Davey compelling Davey, as Secretary of Continental Corporation, to produce "[a]ll Machine-Sensible Data Media used for recording, consolidating or
summarizing accounting or financial transactions and records in respect of
general expenses and losses expended or incurred during the years 1971 and
1972, including but not limited to Magnetic Tape number 110101 and
Magnetic Tape number 421001, for each year respectively." 9 Continental
refused to furnish the tapes, offering instead printouts of the contents of the
specified tapes.II Although the district court ruled that the IRS was entitled to
the tapes themselves in response to the summons, the court allowed access
only to copies of the tapes, and issued a protective order allowing Continental
to retain the originals." The district court compelled Continental to create
copies of the responsive tapes under the supervision of the IRS, and required
the IRS to bear the cost of producing the copies. 2 On cross-appeals, the Second Circuit ordered the original tapes turned over to the Internal Revenue
Service and voided the cost reimbursement portion of the lower court's
order' 3 Continental argued on appeal that section 7602 of the Internal
Revenue Code" covered only visible and legible records, and not information
stored on computer tape. 5 The Davey court pointed out that section 7602
placed no limitations on the form or medium in which the records were kept,
and that "[iln this era of developing information-storage technology there is
no conceivable reason to adopt a construction that would immunize companies with computer-based record-keeping systems from IRS scrutiny."' 6
Pursuant to Rule 34, a discovering party such as Round-The-Bend can
seek production of magnetic disks, magnetic tapes, or other media which contain sales data.' 7 Out of an abundance of caution, Round-The-Bend's counsel
9. Id. at 1283-84.
10. Id. at 1284.
11. Id. at 1284-85.
12. Id. at 1285.
13. 543 F.2d at 1000-01.
14. Section 7602(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code allows the Internal Revenue Service to
compel production of "any books, papers, records and other data which may be relevant or
material. . ." I.R.C. § 7602(a)(1); see 543 F.2d at 999 (discussing I.R.C. § 7602(a)(I)).
15. 543 F.2d at 999.
16. Id. Discovery of electronically stored information from non-parties can be obtained by
having a subpoena duces tecum, issued pursuant to Rule 45(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, served on the possessors of the information. See, e.g., In re Franklin Nat'l. Bank Securities Litig., 574 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1978), modified, 599 F.2d 1109 (2d Cir. 1979); see also
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (CCH) § 2.715 (1977), at 74 [hereinafter cited as MANUAL].
17. The MANUAL states that:
[iun the computer context, the basic types of machine records commonly utilized include: (1) punched cards; (2) paper and magnetic tapes; and (3) a variety of other machine-oriented components which record and store data. In the absence of special considerations such as privilege, work product immunity, or the presence of industrial or
trade secrets in the machine-readable computerized data (including computerized
analyses), any of the above-mentioned forms should be freely discoverable. If the discovering party has data processing equipment that is compatible with that of the owner
of the computer records, delivery of the machine-readable version of the information,
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might use an expensive definition of the term "document" in the preface to a
Rule 34 document demand to cover any possible ambiguity in the Rule and request production of data sheets, punched cards, magnetic tapes, plotteroutput recordings, data discs, data cards, data processing files, data compilations from which information can be obtained and translated, and other
computer-readable records. Round-The-Bend's counsel might also specifically
direct that the electronic media, rather than the hard copy, be produced. The
use of such definitions and instructions is a common practice that has met
with repeated judicial approval. 1"
COURT ORDERED ASSISTANCE IN CONNECTION WITH
THE DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONICALLY STORED DATA

It is clear from the Advisory Committee's 1970 comments on the amendment to Rule 34 that a court may require ABA to assist Round-The-Bend by
compelling ABA to translate the electornically stored data into a "reasonably
usable" format, such as the now all-too-familiar "green bar" computer printout, for Round-The-Bend's perusal. 9 If Round-The-Bend desires to obtain
the magnetic media containing ABA's sales data and ABA resists, RoundThe-Bend should be entitled to a court order compelling production of the
magnetic media containing ABA's sales records. As the district court noted to
Adams v. Dan River Mills, Inc.,2° there is no reason why documents of this
2
nature should not be subject to discovery. '
If Round-The-Bend has data processing equipment that is capable of
"translating" the magnetically stored data into reasonably usable form and is
thoroughly conversant with ABA's data processing system, computer programming techniques, and data processing system, computer programming
techniques, and data processing conventions, Round-The-Bend may not require anything from ABA beyond an electronically duplicated copy of the
contents of the storage medium itself. Mere production of the magnetic
medium will not, however, satisfy a Rule 34 request when Round-The-Bend is
unable to readily use the machine-readable version of the information. In
such circumstances, Round-The-Bend should seek to have the court compel
or a copy thereof, will often be sufficient. When the discovering party's equipment is
not compatible, or he has no computer equipment, delivery of a printout of the
machine-readable records may provide a reasonable alternative mode of discovery.
MANUAL, supra note 16, § 2.715, at 74-75.
18. See, e.g., Diversified Products Corp. v. Sports Center Co., 42 F.R.D. 3 (D. Md. 1967).
19. See 1970 Advisory Committee Statement, supra note 6, at 527.
[W]hen the data can as a practical matter be made usuable by the discovering party
only through respondent's devices, respondent may be required to use his devices to
translate the data into usable form. In many instances, this means that respondent will
have to supply a printout of computer data.
Id.
20. 54 F.R.D. 220 (W.D. Va. 1972).
21. Id. at 22; see also, e.g., Dunn v. Midwestern Indemnity, 88 F.R.D. 191 (S.D. Ohio
1980).
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ABA to furnish further information and assistance. A number of courts have
been amenable to such requests.
In Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM 22 plaintiff Greyhound received
responses to interrogatories stating that source materials containing information responsive to the interrogatories were located at several of defendant
IBM's plants.23 IBM invited counsel for Greyhound to review these source
materials at the various plants. 2 Greyhound's counsel accepted the offer and
was ushered into a room, where he was overwhelmed by thousands of documents.1 5 On Greyhound's motion to compel an additional response by IBM,
the court ordered IBM to provide someone familiar with the material to guide
and assist the plaintiff or its representatives in discovering the answers it
desired, and to furnish to the plaintiff such printouts and any typed information which would aid in securing the answers. 26
In the JapaneseElectronic ProductsAntitrust Litigation 27 the defendants
sought discovery of computer tapes containing sales information respecting
the products there at issue. 28 The district court required the plaintiff to
prepare a tape of the electronically stored information for the defendants' use
in analyzing the plaintiff's sales. 29 In order to perform that task, the plantiff
had to develop a program to extract and print the data requested on magnetic
tape. 30 The plaintiff was also required to produce record format information
so that the defendants could program their computer system to read the information stored on the computer tape which the distict court ordered the plain31
tiff to produce.
It is apparent from decisions such as Greyhound and JapaneseElectronic
ProductsAntitrust Litigation that a court should be receptive to a motion
compelling ABA to assist Round-The-Bend in interpreting the electronically
stored data and understanding ABA's computer programs and programming
techniques. In appropriate circumstances this assistance could take the form
of an order that ABA produce information concerning the record formatting

22. 3 Computer L. Serv. Rep. 138 (D. Minn. 1971).
23. Id. at 139.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 139; see also, e.g., Saddler v. Musicland-Pickwick Int'l, Inc., 31 Fed. R. Serv. 2d
760 (E.D. Tex. 1980). In SCM v. Xerox Corp., plaintiff SCM sought more detailed responses to
interrogatories concerning Xerox's patents, patent applications, and license agreements. SCM
Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 1975-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,484, at 67,149 (D. Conn. 1975). The court
directed Xerox to identify the specific documents that contained the information SCM sought, but
noted tht it was up to SCM to "abstract and categorize" whatever detail SCM thought would be
useful to its case. Id. at 67,149.
27. Nat'l. Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa.

1980).
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 1258.
Id. at 1261-63.
Id. at 1262.
Id.
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conventions and computer programming techniques adopted by ABA in capturing and processing the sales data, 3" produce a tape containing the pertinent
data concerning the sale of Round-The-Bend's products by ABA, 33 and
designate an employee, possibly Ms. Davenport, to answer questions concerning the proper use and interpretation of the computer programs and electronic
data.3 4 A court might also permit Round-The-Bend to discover the
capabilities, capacities, and data processing techniques used by ABA in connection with ABA's data processing operation.3 As the Manualfor Complex
Litigation observes:

[i]n many instances it will be essential for the discovering party to
know the underlying theory and the procedures employed in preparing and storing the machine-readable records. When this is true,
litigants should be allowed to discover any material relating to the
record holder's computer hardware, the programming techniques
employed in connection with the relevant data, the principles governing the structure of the stored data, and the operation of the data
processing system. When statistical analyses have been developed
from more traditional records with the assistance of computer techniques, the underlying data used to compose the statistical computer input, the methods used to select, categorize, and evaluate the data for
analysis, and all of the computer outputs normally are proper subjects for discovery. 6

32. See Pearl Brewing Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 415 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Tex.
1976) (court ordered plaintiffs to deliver entire system documentation to defendants); United
States v. Int'l. Business Mach. Corp., 76 F.R.D. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (court ordered IBM to produce extensive system doucmentation and appointed examiner to assist in process). The documentation that a discovering party might need to understand and interpret the computer programs and
data stored on a respondent's computer system include source documents, operations manuals,
record format layouts, systems flow charts, program instructions, printout format instructions,
and user's manuals. See R. Pott, Discovery of Computer Evidence: Drafting a Subpeona, in ABA
COMPUTER EVIDENCE PROGRAM, supra note 3 (1982); T. Edwald, Discovery and the Computer, in
USE OF COMPUTERS IN LITIGATION (J.H. Young, M.E. Kris & H.D. Trainor eds. 1981).

33. For a discussion of how a corporation might extract specific sales information from a
mass of general sales records, see Singer, Proposed Changs to the FederalRules of Evidence as
Applied to Computer-GeneratedEvidence, 7 J. COMPUTERTECH. L. 157, 161-63 (1979).
34. See Pretrial Order No. 4, Paragraphs 21-25, In re Data General Antitrust Litigation,
MDL Docket No. 369 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 1979), reprintedin FEDERAL DISCOVERY IN COMPLEX
CIVIL CASES 159-67 (Law Journal-Seminars Press 1980); see also Bell v. Automobile Club of
Michigan, 80 F.R.D. 228 (E.D. Mich. 1978), appealdim'd, 601 F.2d 587 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 918 (1979); United States v. Int'l. Business Mach. Corp., 76 F.R.D. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
35. See Dunn v. Midwestern Indemnity, 88 F.R.D. 191 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (court held plaintiffs entitled to discovery of identity of defendants' computer equipment, raw data input into computer system, programs defendants used in processing data, and data management systems used to
control data processing functions); see also Pretrial Order No. 4, Paragraphs 21-25, In re Data
General Antitrust Litigation, MDL Docket No. 369 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 1979), reprinted in
FEDERAL DISCOVERY IN COMPLEX CIVIL CASES

36.

MANUAL,

159-67 (Law Journal-Seminars Press 1980).

supra note 16, § 2.715, at 75.
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Faced with requests for assistance in interpreting electronically stored
data, other courts have ordered respondents to not only locate and produce
"computerized" information, but also to analyze the information on their
own computers for the discovering party's benefit. In Lodge 743, International Ass'n of Machinists v. United Aircraft Corp. 31 the defendant responded to certain interrogatories by delivering to the plaintiff 450 pounds of
documents containing 120,000 selected individual personnel records.38 Despite
the defendant's representation that answering the interrogatories would be a
herculean task that the defendant's data processing equipment could not hndle, the Lodge 743 court ordered the defendant to analyze the records at its
own expense "in acordance with the electronic analytical procedures defendant's counsel represented to the Court on the record in prior hearings would
be necessary to accomplish the assemblage of the data required." 39 In
Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. ,40 a race and sex discrimination case in which
the plaintiffs sought to prove the discrimination by statistical analysis, the
defendant produced wage cards for all of its employees in response to the
plaintiffs' request for production. 4' The plaintiffs later sought to compel pro4 2
duction of the defendant's computer tapes containing the same information.
The trial court refused the request, but did order the defendant to process
whatever computer runs were requested by the plaintiffs."'
In an extreme case, a court might even require ABA to "computerize" its
own data and to perform a computer analysis of that data for the discovering
party's benefit. In Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.4 the plaintiff, in a
products liability action, sought Rule 34 discovery of complaints of similar incidents. 4' When the defendant Sears did not produce the information, the
plaintiffs sought and secured a Rule 37 default judgment as to liability.46 In
support of its motion to set aside the default, Sears maintained that because
of its longstanding practice of indexing claims alphabetically by name of claimant rather than by type of product, there was no practical way other than to
examine every claim in the index, a task Sears maintained was impossible,
that Sears could determine whether there had been any complaints similar to
those the plaintiff had alleged.47 The Kozlowski court ruled that Sears had a
duty to produce the records of similar claims, and that Sears could not excuse
itself from its Rule 34 obligations by "utilizing a system of record-keeping
which conceals rather than discloses relevant records, or by making it unduly
37. 220 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn. 1963), aff'd, 337 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
908 (1965).
38. Id. at 21-22.
39. Id. at 21.
40. 665 F.2d 918 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 302 (1982).
41. Id. at 932.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 73 F.R.D. 73 (D. Mass. 1976).
45. Id. at 74.
46. Id. at 74-75.
47. Id. at 76.
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difficult to identify or locate them, thus rendering the production of the
documents an excessively burdensome and clostly expedition. ' 48
DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION
WHEN THE RESPONDENT HAS ALREADY PRODUCED
THE UNDERLYING DATA IN ANOTHER MEDIUM

The discovery rules contemplate production of electronically stored infor9
Can
mation in a readily usable format, such as a "green bar" printout.
then, Round-The-Bend compel ABA to produce electronically stored information in machine-readable form notwithstanding ABA's prior production of
the identical material in hard copy? This question has arisen in several cases,
with different results.

In Adams v. Dan Rivers Mills, Inc. the plaintiff filed a Rule 34 request

seeking the defendant's computerized master payroll file and computer printouts of W-2 forms."0 The defendant objected on the grounds that the plaintiff
had already been furnished with documents which contained the same information and that the defendant was under no obligation to provide documents

in any particular specified form." Noting that there was no reason why the
computer tapes were not the proper subject of discovery, the Adams court required the defendant to produce the W-2 printouts and payroll file in approp-

riate computerized form. 2
A similar issue arose in the JapaneseElectronic ProductsAntitrust Litigation. 3 The defendants there sought to compel one of the plaintiff companies

to use its own computer to perform the work necessary to create a computerreadable tape containing certain sales and product data previously supplied by

the plaintiff in hard copy."' Counsel for the defendants maintained that, although counsel could read the hard copy printout, they could not analyze the
data effectively until it could read by the defendants' computers." The plain-

tiff claimed that, although the discovery rules required production of the material in computer printout form, they did not require actual "manufacture"

48. Id.; see also Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. LeMay, 93 F.R.D. 379 (S.D. Ohio
1981). But see Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978). The Kozlowski decision
was distinguished in Webb v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. on the ground that the defendant's conduct in Kozlowski approached the "level of willful disregard for the interests of the public." See
Webb v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 27 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 589 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
49. The requirement that a party translate information in its possession into a reasonably
usable form has been limited to computer data. See In re Puerto Rico Elec. Power Auth., 687 F.2d
501 (1st Cir. 1982) (court reversed district court order compellihg plaintiff to translate documents
from Japanese into English).
50. Adams v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 220, 221 (W.D. Va. 1972).
51. Id. at 221-22.
52. Id. at 222.
53. Nat'l Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa.
1980).
54. Id. at 1258.
55. Id.
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of a tape which did not theretofore exist. 5 6 Dismissing this objection as a
mechanical rather than qualitative difference," the district court held that
common sense as well as a growing body of precedent supported the defendant's request and required the plaintiffs to create and furnish the requested
tape. 8 The district court observed that in order to produce the computerprinted information in tape form, all that was necessary was for the plaintiff's
computer specialists to re-run the program used to extract and print the computer reports on paper with a new instruction directing the computer to print
the results in computer-readable form on magnetic tape.59
A request for production of the electronically recorded form of documents already produced in discovery would seem to be addressed to the discretion of the trial court. Given the fact that duplication of electronic data is
relatively inexpensive, at least when compared with the cost of re-inputing the
data, the courts ought to be inclined to order production of the electronically
stored version even if the hard copy version has already been produced.6" Not
all courts have agreed with this view, however. In Williams v. Owens-Illinois,
Inc. the defendant produced wage cards containing certain statistical information requested by the plaintiffs. 6' When the plaintiffs later sought to compel
production of the computer tapes, which apparently contained the same information as the wage cards, the trial court refused.62 The Ninth Circuit,
while remanding the case on other grounds, held that the plaintiff's request
court and refused to
for the tapes was addressed to the discretion of the trial 63
tapes.
the
of
production
compel
to
court
trial
the
order
On the facts disclosed in the appellate court opinion, the ruling in the
Williams case appears to be shortsighted. Litigants ought to be entitled to
prove their claims in the most expeditious manner possible. It should be obvious that if the Williams plaintiffs wished to "computerize" the employment
data in order to perform various alternative manipulations of the sex and race
statistics, 64 and if the tapes containing this data were readily obtainable from
the defendant without undue expense, fidelity to Rule 1 of the Federal Rules

56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1259.
1260.
1261.
1260.

60. See United States v. AT&T Co., 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,568 (D.D.C. 1980).
61. Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d 918, 932 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
302 (1982).
62. Id.

63. Id.at 933. The Williams court noted that "[aill information contained on the computer
tapes was included in the wage cards which [plaintiff] discovered. [Plaintiffs] were therefore not
deprived of any data. While using the cards may have been more time consuming, difficult and expensive, these reasons, of themselves, do not show that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying [plaintiffs] the tapes." Id.
64. See Comment, ComputerDiscoveryin FederalLitigation:Playingby the Rules, 69 GEO.

L.J. 1465, 1480 (1981).
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the trial court should have required
of Civil Procedure 65 would suggest that
66
the defendant to produce the tapes.
COST ALLOCATION RESPECTING PRODUCTION OF ELECTRONICALLY
STORED INFORMATION

Rule 34 normally places on parties such as ABA the cost burden of pro-

ducing the original magnetic media containing the electronically stored data.
Round-The-Bend, as the party seeking the data, would normally bear the cost
of securing copies of the contents of the media. 67 ABA's initial expense of
producing even the originals may, however, be shifted to Round-The-Bend by
invocation of Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
allows a court to protect parties from "undue burden or expense incurred as a
6 '8
result of discovery practice."
In addressing whether a party's response to a Rule 34 production request
requiring the production of the electronic media would burden that party un-

duly, 69 the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules indicated that a court

should be guided by the actual needs of the party seeking the data.7" Another
factor which the courts have considered in deciding whether to shift all of the
65. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall be construed to secure
"just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action").
66. Cf. Donaldson v. Pillsbury Co., 554 F.2d 825, 832 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 856
(1977). Compelling the defendant to process the computer runs sought by the plaintiffs in the
Williams case would not appear to be a viable alternative for the plaintiffs under the facts of the
Williams case. Counsel for the plaintiffs ought not to be compelled to share his work productgenerated theories of liability with opposing counsel. Requiring the defendant to generate alternate computer runs when and as requested by the plaintiffs, however, does just that.
67. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34; cf. Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578 (1973); In re Puerto
Rico Elec. Power Auth., 687 F.2d 501 (lst Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury No. 76-3 (MIA) Subpoena
Duces Tecum, 555 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1977).
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); 1979 Advisory Committee Statement, supra note 6, at 526-27
(Rule 26(c) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure now affords protection to claims of privacy,
secrecy, or undue burden or expense). The Second Circuit in Sanders v. Levy acknowledged that
Rule 26(c), coupled with Rule 34, allows district courts to shift the expense of special computer
programming to the discovering party if the demand for information would impose upon the party
supplying the information sought "undue burden or expense," but held that the district judge in
Sanders did not abuse his discretion in declining to do so. Sanders v. Levy, 558 F.2d 636, 649 (2d
Cir. 1977), rev'don othergroundssub. non., Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340
(1978).
69. The fact that a discovery request is "burdensome" is generally not a sufficient reason to
deny Rule 34 discovery. See In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 83 F.R.D. 251, 255 (N.D. I11.
1978). A court may, however, limit a document request on the grounds of undue burden. See
United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 89 F.R.D. 578, 582 (E.D. Wisc. 1981); United States v. Exxon
Corp., 87 F.R.D. 624, 634-35 (D.D.C. 1980). A court may also require a sharing of the costs of
production. See Matter of Hawaii Corp., 88 F.R.D. 518, 522 (D. Hawaii 1980).
70. See 1970 Advisory Committee Statement, supra note 6, at 527 (appraisal of "undue"
burden inevitably entails consideration of needs of party seeking discovery); see also, e.g., Dunn v.
Midwestern Indemnity, 88 F.R.D. 191 (S.D. Ohio 1980); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. United Aircraft Corp., 220 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn. 1963), aff'd, 337 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 908 (1965).
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producing party's costs to the discovering party is whether the cost of the pro-

ducing party's compliance with the discovery request is merely incidental to

7
its normal cost of doing business. In Blank v. Talley Industries, Inc. sub-

poenas duces tecum were issued to a number of brokerage houses requiring
the production of computer tapes containing lists of beneficial owners of
stock."' The beneficial owners were potential members of the plaintiff class in
a securities fraud action. 7 1 One brokerage house refused to produce the requested computer tapes unless the plaintiff paid it $570, the sum alleged to be
the brokerage house's cost of operating the computer. 7 The Blank court,

however, characterized the expense as ordinary overhead necessarily incurred
in responding to normal and customary court orders, and refused to shift the
cost to the class representative. 7 1 Similarly, in United States v. Davey the Se-

cond Circuit ruled that the Internal Revenue Service was entitled to the

76
original of the computer tape containing the requested financial data. The
court stated that the cost of any duplicate prepared for the producing party's
use would be borne by the producing party. 77 The Second Circuit noted that

the cost of the duplicate-$1,305-was minimal in comparison to the amount
party each year in cooperating with the Internal Revspent by the producing
78
enue Service.
In Adams v. Dan River Mills, Inc., however, the court shifted the cost of
71. 54 F.R.D. 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. The district court in Blank stated that:
[iln view of the number of brokerage firms involved in the plaintiffs' court-ordered
quest for class members' identities, it would be unfair to compel the plaintiffs to cover
the costs of the firms' production of information, which costs when accumulated would
indeed be burdensome. No other broker has requested reimbursement. In this class action I do not feel compelled in my discretion to require plaintiffs to pay the expenses of
Merrill Lynch. These expenses are in the nature of overhead expenses necessary for responding to legitimate court orders involving the customers of stockbrokers.
Id.; see also, In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Securities Litig., 574 F.2d 662, 675-76 (2d Cir. 1978),
modified, 599 F.2d 1109 (2nd Cir. 1979).
Expenses of production in responding to Rule 45 subpoenas are ordinarily borne by the
responding party. As with Rule 34, however, a court may shift costs by conditioning the right of
the party to secure document production in response to a subpoena upon reimbursement to the
responding party of the expenses of production. Rule 45 specifically provides that a court may
"condition denial of the motion [to quash] upon the advancement by the person in whose behalf
the subpoena is issued of the reasonable cost of producing the books, papers, documents, or tangible things" FED. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(2); See, e.g., Pollitt v. Mobay Chemical Corp., 95 F.R.D. 101
(S.D. Ohio 1982); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litig.,
669 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 666 F.2d 364
(9th Cir. 1982).
76. United States v. Davey, 543 F.2d 996, 1001 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'g andremanding, 404 F.
Supp. 1283 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
77. Id.
78. Id.
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production to the plaintiffs when the plaintiffs sought to require the defendant to furnish machine-readable versions of data the defendants had already
produced." Similarly, in PearlBrewing Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Co.8 the court
conditioned the defendant's access to the plaintiff's computer experts' tapes
and programming materials on payment of the costs of duplication." In the
Japanese Electronic ProductsAntitrust Litigation the defendants offered to
pay the cost of duplicating the computer tape as part of their motion to com82
pel.
PRODUCTION OF ELECTRONICALLY STORED DATA IN RESPONSE TO
INTERROGATORY PRACTICE
Round-The-Bend can, of course, serve a set of interrogatories on ABA
seeking a detailed itemization of ABA's prior sales of Round-The-Bend products and a detailed explanation of the manner in which ABA calculates its
lost profits damages. Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure normally imposes a duty upon ABA to answer interrogatories at its own expense.1 3 Where the answers to the interrogatories are derived from ABA's

business records and where the burden of deriving the answer is substantially
the same for Round-The-Bend as for ABA, Rule 33(c) allows ABA, in lieu of
providing written answers, to afford Round-The-Bend a reasonable opportunity to examine and copy the records which contain the responsive information. 4 Respondents such as ABA will frequently invoke rule 33(c) in response
to such interrogatories and offer to produce electronic data or computer
printouts.
79. Adams v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 220, 222 (W.D. Va. 1972).
80. 415 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
81. Id. at 1140-41; see also Fauteck v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 91 F.R.D. 393 (N.D. I11.
1980).
82. Nat'l Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1257, 1258-59
(E.D. Pa. 1980).
83. See FED. R. Civ. P. 33(c).
84. Id. Rule 33(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states:
[w]here the answer to an interrogatory may be derived or ascertained from the business
records of the party upon whom the interrogatory has been served or from an examination, audit or inspection of such business records, including a compilation, abstract or
summary thereof, and the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer is substantially
the same for the party serving the interrogatory as for the party served, it is a sufficient answer to such interrogatory to specify the records from which the answer may be derived or
ascertained and to afford to the party serving the interrogatory reasonable opportunity
to examine, audit or inspect such records and to make copies, compilations, abstracts
or summaries. A specification shall be in sufficient detail to permit the interrogatory
party to locate and identify, as readily as can be party served, the records from which
the answer may be ascertained.
Even prior to the 1980 amendment to Rule 33(c), which added the last sentence of the Rule,
it was clear that the "respondent may not impose on the interrogating party a mass of records as
to which research is feasible only for one familiar with the records." 1970 Advisory Committee
Statement, supra note 6, at 524-25. Because of the widespread perception that the increasingly
routine response to interrogatories was the submission of a mass of business records or an offer
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Round-The-Bend can challenge ABA's invocation of the Rule 33(c) option by demonstrating that the burden of deriving the responsive information
from the machine-readable records is not substantially the same for RoundThe-Bend as it is for ABA. Resolution of a Round-The-Bend motion to compel ABA to furnish written answers will depend upon factual showings as to
the following: the relative abilities of ABA and Round-The-Bend to manipulate the computer data; the costs of manipulating the computer data; the types
of reports normally generated by ABA; the equipment and programming capacities of both Round-The-Bend and ABA; whether the interrogatory answers
to be derived require extensive data manipulation not normally performed by
ABA; and whether a printout or other report containing information of the
type sought is customarily generated in the ordinary course of ABA's
business."
The Supreme Court addressed tangentially the question of the sufficiency
,of a Rule 33(c) response offering electronically stored information in Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders.86 There, the district court certified a class of
121,000 shareholders and required the defendant Fund to compile, from the
transfer agent's records, a list of all members of the class. 87 This compilation
required the manual sorting of the class members' names and addresses from
records maintained on paper, the keypunching of approximately 300,000
computer cards, and the creation of new computer programs for use with
both the existing tapes and the tapes created from the paper records. 8 The defendant Fund appealed the district court's order requiring the defendant,
rather than the plaintiff, to bear the cost of identifying the members of the
plaintiff class. 89 The Supreme Court ruled that the representative of the plaintiff class, and not the defendant, must bear the cost of identifying the names
and addresses of potential members of the class."0 Justice Powell analogized
the cost-shifting inquiry under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the cost shifting considerations under the discovery rules." He focused particular attention on the critical language of Rule 33(c) which allows"
the respondent to interrogatories to make available the documents from
to make all of one's records available, the drafters added the final sentence to Rule 33(c) "to
make it clear that a responding party has the duty to specify, by category and location, the
records from which answers to interrogatories can be derived." FED. R. Civ. P. 33(c) advisory
committee note, reprintedin 85 F.R.D. 521, 531 (1980).
85. Cf. Al Barnett & Sons, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 611 F.2d 32, 35 (3rd Cir.
1979); Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United Parcel Serv. of America, Inc., 27 Fed. R. Serv. 2d
622, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see generally Comment, Computer Discovery in Federal Litigation:
Playing by the Rules, 69 GEo. L.J. 1465, 1475-78 (1981).
86. 437 U.S. 340 (1978), rev'g, 558 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1978).
87. Id. at 345-46.
88. Id. at 345.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 363-64; see generally Comment, Cost of Notice in Class Actions After
OppenheimerFund, Inc. v. Sanders, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1517 (1978).
91. 437 U.S. 340, 355-60 (1978), rev'g sub. nom. Sanders v. Levy, 558 F.2d 646 (2d Cir.
1977).
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which the interrogatory answer can be derived where the burden of deriving
the answer would be "substantially the same" for either party.92 According to
Justice Powell, "[tihis provision is intended to place the 'burden of discovery
upon its potential benefitee' .. . where the burden would not be 'substantially
the same' and can be far more benefiticially performed by the party subject to
the interrogatory request. Discovery rules normally require the responding
party to derive the answer itself.' 93 In response to the Second Circuit's suggestion below that the fact that part of the records were kept on computer
tapes justified imposing a greater burden on the Fund than might be imposed
on a party whose records are kept in another form, Justice Powell observed
that there was no reason to believe that the information would be any less ex94
pensive to extract if kept in a more traditional fashion.
In Foster v. Boise Cascade, Inc.95 the plaintiff in a Title VII action propounded certain interrogatories, which the defendant answered by stating that
the required information was contained in the personnel files in the defendant's offices and offering to make the records available to the plaintiff for inspection.' 6 The documents included computer tapes containing personnel information. 7 The plaintiffs moved to compel specific answers to the interrogatories, contending that the defendant had improperly invoked Rule
33(c). 98 The court observed that "despite the fact that defendant has offered
to make available to plaintiffs' counsel the subject files of the interrogatories,
plaintiffs raise the valid objection that lack of familiarity with, and inability
to locate crucial documents within defendants' files, would substantially
hamper plaintiffs' ability to prosecute this lawsuit in an efficacious, timely
manner." 99 The court ruled that the information requested was not as accessible to the plaintiffs as to the defendant, and that the burden imposed upon
the defendant to compile the information would be substantially less than that
imposed on the plaintiffs.100
In some circumstances the court may have an opportunity to "split the
baby" when faced with a question of the adequacy of a Rule 33(c) offer involving computer tapes. InPenk v. OregonState Boardof HigherEducation,
'0
the plaintiffs, desiring discovery of computer tapes containing employment
data, sought an order from the court compelling the defendant to update and
supply newer and more accurate computer tapes of the statistical information
which already existed on tape. 02 The plaintiffs claimed they could not perform

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 357.
Id.
Id. at 362-63; see 558 F.2d at 649.
20 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 466 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
Id. at 467-68.
Id. at 468.
Id. at 468-69.
Id. at 470.
Id.; see Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 17 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 719, 722 (N.D. Ind. 1973).
35 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 420 (D. Ore. 1982).
Id. at 421.
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the computer analyses required to prove their discrimination claim with data
containing inaccuracies. ,3 The district court agreed with the defendant's argument that normally a party should not be compelled to answer an interrogatory that requires a compilation of data when that party is willing to allow
the requesting party access to records from which the requesting party can
make its own compilation of data.'14 The court in Penk noted that an exception to this general rule exists where a compilation would be made by the interrogated party in the course of preparation for trial.' 5 The Penk court ruled
that if the defendant did not need and would not use a more refined set of data
at the trial then the defendant did not need to prepare a more accurate set of
data for the plaintiff. 10 6 If, however, the defendant intended to use a more accurate set of data at the trial, the Penk court held that the defendant would be
0
required to deliver that data to the plaintiffs.'1
"COMPUTERIZED"

EVIDENCE AT TRIAL

In the hypothetical, ABA proposes to offer certain computer printouts into evidence at trial. The prior sales history printout will doubtless be offered
into evidence under the business records exception to hearsay rule.'", Successful invocation of the business records exception to the hearsay rule requires ABA to prove that the computer printout contains data captured in the
regular course of ABA's business at or near the time of the sales transactions,
and that the sources of the information contained in the printout demonstrate
the trustworthiness of the printout. A qualified witness from ABA must testify
to the manner of preparation of both the data and the printouts.' 0 9 Discovery
103. Id. at 422.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. The Penk court stated that:
[i]f indeed both sides require the use of a more accurate data base, this court strongly
urges the parties to work together to create one at the lowest possible cost. It would be
wasteful and a hinderance to the clear presentation of evidence at trail for the parties to
operate under separate data bases.
Id.
108. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6) (business records exception to rule against hearsay); cf. King v.
State ex rel. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 222 So.2d 393 (Miss. 1969) (applying business records
exception); Crowe v. Coursey, 601 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (same); Missouri Valley
Walnut Co. v. Snider, 569 S.W.2d 324 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (same); Transport Indemnity Co. v.
Seib, 178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W.2d 871 (1965) (same); Monarch Fed. Savings and Loan Ass'n v.
Genser, 156 N.J. Super. 107, 383 A.2d 475 (1977) (same); see generally Annot., 7 A.L.R. 4th 8
(1981); Annot., 11 A.L.R. 3rd 1368 (1967).
ABA's computer printouts might also be admissible under Rule 1006 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence as summaries of voluminous data if the underlying data is admissible. See FED. R. EVjD.
1006; United States v. Dioguardi, 428 F.2d 1033 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 825 (1970); Fairchild Stratos Corp. v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 337 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1969).
109. Cf. R. Johnston, A Guide for the Proponent and Opponent of Computer Based Evidence, in ABA COMPUTER EVIDENCE PROGRAM, supra note 3; C. Williams, Current State of the
Law Concerning Admissibility of Computer-Based Evidence, in ABA COMPUTER EVIDENCE PROGRAM,

supra note 3.
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of the foundational facts concerning each of these elements is essential if

Round-The-Bend is to contest ABA's offer of the computer printouts into
evidence.
Round-The-Bend's task of pretrial discovery is compounded in the hypothetical because ABA contemplates offering the "lost profit projection" printout into evidence. The "lost profit projection" printout is the result of a com-

puter model or simulation which provides the basis for Mr. Everwright's
testimony as to the results of the computer analysis."' It is not a business
record under Rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, but rather a dis-

guised form of expert opinion."' Round-The-Bend's timely discovery of the

underlying data and the computer programs which yield the "lost profit projections" is essential if Round-The-Bend is to successfully challenge the admis2 Round-The-Bend's
sibility of the "lost profit projection" printout. ",
counsel

will need access to this same documentation if Mr. Everwright's testimony as
to damages is to be fairly tested on cross-examination.
While Rule 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires disclosure of the

data underlying an expert's testimony on cross-examination, Rule 26(b)(4) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for only limited pretrial deposition of the facts underlying the expert's opinions." 3 A party may learn
through interrogatories the opinions to which the expert is expected to testify,
as well as the factual basis for those opinions."" Upon motion a court may
permit deposition of the expert" 5 and may compel the production of
documents prepared by the expert.' 6 A court will typically require some showing of need that has not been satisfied by the interrogatory answers before permitting discovery of an expert by deposition and prior to compelling an expert
'7
to produce documents.
110. Cf. Eastin, The Use of Models in Litigation: Concise or Contrived?; see generally 52
CHI

[-]
KENT L. REV. 610 (1980).

111. Cf. R. Johnston, A Guide for the Proponent and Opponent of Computer Based Evidence, in ABA COMPUTER EVIDENCE PROGRAM, supra note 3; C. Williams, Current State of the
Law Concerning Admissibility of Computer-Based Evidence, in ABA COMPUTER EVIDENCE PRO.
GRAM,

supra note 3.

112. Cf. Griffin v. Bolger, 35 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 759 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (court denied "eve-oftrial" request for copy of computer tape which was basis of expert's testimony.)
113. Compare FED. R. EVID. 705 (expert witness may testify in terms of opinions or inferences and give his reasons therefore without prior disclosure of underlying facts or data unless
court requires otherwise, but expert may be required to disclose underlying facts or data on crossexamination) with FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i) (party may discover through interrogatories the
identity of expert witness, subject matter upon which expert expected to testify, substance of facts
and opinions to which expert expected to testify, and summary of grounds for expert's opinion).
114. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i).
115. See generally Chu, Discovery of Experts, 8 LITIGATION Winter 1982, at 13.
116. See Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Division, United Aircraft Corp., 74 F.R.D. 594 (D.
Conn. 1977).
117. The fact that courts typically require a showing of need before permitting either deposition of an expert or production of documents from an expert reflects the concern that a party
should be prevented from building his own case upon the opinions of experts retained by others.
See In re Brown Co. Securities Litig., 54 F.R.D. 384, 385 (E.D. La. 1972); Friedenthal, Discovery
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The courts have shown increasing sensitivity to the requirements of
counsel in preparing effective cross-examination of experts whose testimony is
based upon computer-generated data,"8I and have been willing to allow a party such discovery of expert witnesses as may be required and appropriate to
identify and examine the computer-generated analysis which underlies the ex1 9 the defendant was
perts' eventual testimony. In United States v. Dioguardi"
0
charged with bankruptcy fraud.' A government witness testified at trial
from figures supplied by a second party, a computer expert, and had no independent knowledge of any of the facts or instructions given to the computer.' 2' The defendant objected to the government's failure to produce the
computer program for examination during trial.'22 The Second Circuit refused to find reversable error, but stated:
[w]e fully agree that the defendants were entitled to know what operations the computer had been instructed to perform and to have the
We place the government
precise instruction that had been given ....
on the clearest possible notice. . . of the great desirability of making
the program and other materials needed for cross-examination of
computer witnesses, such as flow charts used in the preparation of23
programs, available to the defense at a reasonable time before trial.
In PearlBrewing Co. the court allowed pretrial discovery of a computer
simulation program prepared by the plaintiff's non-trial witness experts for
use in demonstrating the economics of the Texas beer market.' 24 There, the
plaintiff's economic expert supervised the design of an econometric computer
model, called the Texas Beer Market Model, which simulated market conditions. 2 5 The plaintiff's experts also prepared a second set of computer programs, called the Damage Assessment Program, which was designed to take
the data generated by the Texas Beer Market Model and convert it into
damage calculations to be presented at trial.2 6 The plaintiff made the computer output and some of the documentation available to the defendant
and Use of an Adverse Party'sExpert Information, 14 STAN. L. REv. 455, 486-87 (1962).
118. As the First Circuit observed in United States v. Cepeda Penes, "[a]ny use of computerized data presents some obstacles to effective cross-examination... because of the difficulty
of knowing the precise methods employed in programming the computer as well as the inability to
determine the effectiveness of the persons responsible for feeding data into the computer." United
States v. Cepeda Penes, 577 F.2d 754, 760-61 (1st Cir. 1978).
119. 428 F.2d 1033 (2nd Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 825 (1970).
120. Id. at 1034.
121. Id. at 1037.
122. Id. at 1038.
123. Id.; see also United States v. Liebert, 519 F.2d 542, 547-48 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 985 (1975). Pretrial discovery of computer evidence pursuant to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure should work in both directions. See United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 404 F. Supp. 619, 621 (D.D.C. 1975).
124. Pearl Brewing Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 415 F. Supp. 1122, 1134 (S.D. Tex.

1976).
125. Id.
126. Id.
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before trial.127 The defendant contended that this information was insufficient to enable their own expert to properly analyze the models, and moved
for discovery access to the non-testifying computer experts who designed the
actual programs.' 28 The district court held that the motion was governed by
Rule 26(b)(4)(B), and ruled that the defendant was entitled, at its own expense, to inspect and copy the entire system documentation for the Texas
Beer Market Model and Damage Assessment Program. 2 9 The defendant was
also afforded an opportunity, again at its own expense, to depose the two
non-trial expert computer programmers."'
As exemplified by PearlBrewing Co., pretrial discovery of the computer
programs and computer data used to form the basis for a testimonial expert's
opinion is increasingly common in complex litigation.' 31 City of Cleveland v.
ClevelandElectric IlluminatingCompany'32 provides another examples of this
use of computer programs and computer data. In City of Cleveland, an antitrust case, the defendants sought to compel pretrial production of the data
and calculations underlying the plaintiff's trial experts' opinions. 1 The trial
court had previously ordered the parties to exchange the names of their respective trial experts and to produce copies of the written reports and conclusions compiled by those experts."' One of the plaintiff's expert's reports reflected the results of various computer simulations.' 3 The defendants, contending that they could not deduce the programs used or the various inputs
and assumptions from the report furnished by the plaintiff and thus could not
adequately prepare for cross-examination of the expert, obtained disclosure
of the data and programs employed36 by the experts in reaching the conclusions
set forth in the published report.
The trial court was not as forthcoming in Perma Research and Development v. Singer Co..131 There, in a breach of contract case, the plaintiff's expert testified concerning the results of a computer simulation that purportedly
demonstrated that a certain anti-skid device could have been further
developed by the defendant despite the defendant's claim that it had done all
it could in developing the device. 38 The trial court denied the defendant access to either the underlying data or the computer program, and this refusal
was upheld on appeal. 39 The Second Circuit ruled that there was no abuse of
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1134-35.
129. Id. at 1138-39.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Division, United Aircraft Corp., 74 F.R.D. 594
(D. Conn. 1977) (aviation disaster litigation).
132. 538 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
133. Id. at 1266.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1266-67.
137. 542 F.2d 111 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 987 (1976).
138. Id.at 115.
139. Id. The computer expert in Perma Research and Development declined to disclose the
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discretion in failing to require disclosure. 1' 4 This holding brought a vigorous
dissent from Judge Van Graafeiland. 14 ' He argued that where a computer is
programmed to produce information specifically for purposes of litigation the
results of that programming are inadmissible hearsay and therefore, the
district court should not have permitted the expert witness to state the results
of the computer's operations without making the program available to opposing counsel well in advance of trial for examination, testing, and possible use
on cross-examination.' 42 Judge Van Graafeiland contended that affording the
defendant an opportunity to investigate the reliability of the computer-generated evidence was particularly essential in view of the persuasive impression
computer analysis can make on the fact finder.' 43 He stated that:
[1]ong before the age of computers, the law was established that an
expert witness might refer to records, such as elaborate mathematical
calculations, if, but only if, such records were made available for inspection by opposing counsel and thorougl cross-examinzation
thereon was permitted. Because of the computer's "ability to
package hearsay and erroneous or misleading data in an extremely
persuasive format," this rule should be strictly adhered to whenever
expert testimony is predicated
upon specially prepared computerized
144
calculations or simulations.
DISCOVERY OF COMPUTER-BASED LITIGATION SUPPORT SYSTEMS

In the course of business litigation it is increasingly frequent that counsel
on one or both sides will use a computer in connection with the establishment
and operation of a litigation support system. Computer-based litigation
systems are available from a number of experienced vendors who offer everything from database software programs capable of running on a small
manner in which the computer was programmed on the grounds that the program was proprietary
and personal work product. Id. Proprietary and other confidential information can be safeguarded during discovery by protective orders issued pursuant to Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. See Fromholz, Discovery, Evidence, Confidentiality and Security Problems
Associated with the Use of Computer-BasedLitigationSupport Systems, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 445,
454-59.
140. The Second Circuit in Perma Research and Development stated that:
[w]hile it might have been better practice for opposing counsel to arrange for the delivery of all details of the underlying data and theorems employed in these simulations
in advance of trial both to avoid unnecessary and belabored issues at trial.., and protect truly proprietary aspects of the programs ... the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing the experts to testify as to this particular basis for the ultimate conclusion that the Perma device was indeed perfectible.
542 F.2d at 115. The Second Circuit held, however, that on the record before it, the defendant failed
to show that it did not have an adequate basis upon which to cross-examine the plaintiff's experts. Id.
141. Id. at 116 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 125.
143. Id. at 125-26.
144. Id.; see also MANUAL, supra note 15, § 2.70, at 70; Id. § 2.717, at 81.
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business personal computer, such as an IBM PC, to complete turn-key operations, including staffing, supported by large mainframes. The computer
systems themselves may encompass simple objective-index systems, indexplus-partial text systems, full-text retrieval systems, or subject coded
systems. 4 The overall design of a litigation support system is generally supervised by a lawyer. 4 6
The work product privilege protects from discovery materials "prepared
in anticipation of litigation or for trial," unless the party seeking discovery
shows a "substantial need" for the information and an inability "without due
hardship to obtain a substantial equivalent" by another means. The privilege
accords strong protection to material that contains the "mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative
of the party."' 1 7 The most common argument employed to bring a litigation
support database within the protection afforded by the work product
privilege is that the database represents more than simply a storehouse of unaltered documents. The argument is typically advanced that the very process
of selecting the documents reflected in the database is work product,
disclosure of which would reveal the judgment of the attorney regarding matters he feels are important to the case.14 8
In the IBM Peripherals49 litigation the plaintiffs, in coordinated antitrust
litigation against IBM, desired to compel IBM to disclose the details of its litigation support system and sought to access to IBM's litigation support system
itself to retrieve documents responsive to certain index terms provided by the
plaintiffs. 0 The plaintiffs' motion was designed essentially to obtain selective
retrieval of the documents produced in other antitrust litigation brought
against IBM.'" IBM invoked Rule 26(b)(3) and maintained that the plaintiffs
could obtain the substantial equivalent to the IBM litigation support system
by creating their own computer support system, albeit at substantial

145. See Comment, ComputerDiscovery in FederalLitigation:Playingby the Rules, 69 GEo.
L.J. 1465, 1483-84 n.98 (1981); Sherman and Kinnard, The Development, Discovery and Use of
Computer Support Systems in Achieving Efficiency in Litigation, 79 COLUNi. L. REv. 267, 268-71
(1979); Comment, Computerized Litigation Support Systems and the Attorney Work Product
Doctrine: The Need for Court Support Against Discovery, 17 VALPARAiSO L. REV. 281, 284-85

(1983).
146. See Madden, Information Management in Complex Litigation, 4 LITIGATION, Spring
1978, at 16.
147. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
148. As the District of Columbia Circuit observed in Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Train:
[elven if they cited portions of the evidence verbatim, the assistants were making an
evaluation of the relative significance of the facts recited in the records. Separating the
pertinent from the impertinent is a judgmental process, something of the highest order;

no one can make a selection of evidence without exercising some kind of judgment,
unless he is simply making a random selection.
Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Train, 491 F.2d 63, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

149. 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. 878 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
150. Id. at 879.
151. See id.
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expense."2 The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion to require IBM to
give further interrogatory answers describing IBM's litigation support system
in detail, and denied the plaintiffs' request for access to the litigation support
system itself. 5 3 The court ruled that the plaintiffs failed to make a sufficient
showing under Rule 26(b)(3) and found that there are "alternative means
available to [plaintiffs] to obtain the equivalent information without undue
hardship."""4
The litigation support system involved in the IBM Peripheralslitigation
was apparently a combination index and full text system. 55 Suppose,
however, that one of the parties merely "computerized" previously non-computerized information for use in formulating its trial strategy and for possible
use by a testimonial expert. Will a court on appropriate motion require the
production of the computer tape containing the computerized data? One
court presented with this question answered in the affirmative. In Fauteck v.
Montgomery Ward & Co. 156 the defendant in a sex discrimination case caused
various objective statistical data concerning its own employees to be input into a computer. 57 The analysis of the data was directed by the defendants' attorneys, who selected both the data to be compiled and the manner of its
compilation. 58 The plaintiff sought a copy of the resulting computer tape
contending that the process of selecting the data and inputting it into a computer involved the mere mechanical retyping of the underlying records, and
thus was not protected by the work product privilege. 5 9 The defendant contended that the selection process itself required the exercise of considerable
judgment, but offered to produce the data if any of the data formed the basis
for an expert's testimony at trial. 6 ° The court observed that if the database
served as the foundation of an expert's trial testimony, the plaintiffs could attack that testimony by challenging the judgments that went into building the
database on which the testimony rested, and the database would be
discoverable prior to trial under Rule 26(b)(4).' 61 The district court also observed that if the plaintiffs' view of the compilation process was the more accurate view, and if the process used by the defendants was essentially
mechanical, then the database was not protected by the work product

152. See id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 879; see also MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., No. 74 Civ. 633 (N.D.
Ill. March 14, 1980) (court held MCI's litigation support database protected by work product
privilege).
155. See Computer L. Serv. Rep. at 879; see also Sherman and Kinnard, The Development,

Discovery and Use of Computer Support Systems in Achieving Efficiency in Litigation, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 287-89 (1979).
156. 91 F.R.D. 393 (N.D. Il. 1980).
157. Id. at 397.

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 398.
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privilege. 62 Without deciding whose version of the facts was correct, the
the database should be prodistrict court concluded that the tape containing 63
discovery.'
pretrial
during
plaintiff
the
to
duced
In complex antitrust litigation one party may create a litigation support
database for use in connection with a particular trial. Suppose that a second
party, or group of litigants on the same side of the issue, obtains through voluntary means access to or a copy of that database. Will that access destroy the
work product privilege so as to enable the common opponent to secure access
to and discovery of its contents? In United States v. AT&T'64 the District of
Columbia Circuit answered this question in the negative.' 6 5 In that case, MCI,
a litigant pressing antitrust claims against AT&T in the Northern District of
Illinois, created a litigation support database for use in the MCI v. A T&T pretrial proceedings.' 66 When the Government subsequently filed suit against
AT&T in the District of Columbia, it enlisted the cooperation of MCI in pursuing their common opponent." 7 MCI furnished the Government's attorneys
with copies of MCI's database containing abstracts of documents, deposition
testimony and exhibits, and provided the documents necessary to explain the
structure of the database, how the information was entered, and how it could
be retrieved. 68 AT&T then served a document request on the Government in
the District of Columbia action requesting that the Government produce the
MCI database and accompanying explanatory documents." 69 MCI intervened
and asserted the work product privilege.' 70 When the trial court overruled
MCI's claim of privilege on the basis of waiver, MCI appealed. ' The District
of Columbia Circuit refused to follow D'Ippolito v. Cities Service Co. 72 and

upheld MCI's claim of privilege. "I The District of Columbia Circuit observed
that protecting the MCI-Government database exchange would ultimately expedite the resolution of the Government's antitrust suit and further the truth
finding process."" The court stated that:
[w]e believe our holding on the waiver issue furthers the purpose of
the work product privilege by protecting attorney's preparations for
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id.
1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,533 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Id.at 76,867-68.

166. Id.at 76,859.

167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.at 76,860.
170. Id.
171. Id.at 76,860-61.
172. 39 F.R.D. 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (court held work product privilege waived through
voluntary disclosure to attorneys in Antitrust Division). But see GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 85 F.R.D. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (court held work product privilege not waived by disclosure to
attorneys in Antitrust Division where disclosure obtained by use of Civil Investigative Demand
issued by Antitrust Division pursuant to Antitrust Civil Process Act).
173. 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,533, at 76,867 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
174. Id. at 76,869.
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trial and encouraging the fullest preparation without fear of access by
adversaries. The work productprivilege rests on the belief that such
promotion of adversarypreparationultimatelyfurthers the truthfinding process. For MCI to contribute the fruit of its analysis to the
Government on those issues common to their two cases will further
the Government's preparation for trial and eliminate some duplication of effort. The advantages of such sharing led the judge in MCI's
Northern District of Illinois case against AT&T to remark, "we believe the court should not only encourage the sharing of discovery in
cases with common fact questions but order it on its own motion
'
even where the parties do not suggest it."'
CONCLUSION

Issues concerning the discoverability of electronic evidence, allocation of
the costs connected with the discovery of electronically stored data, courtordered assistance in fathoming the mysteries of computer data processing,
complications created by wide-spread expert usage of computers in preparation of trial testimony, and the implications of the burgeoning use of computer-based litigation support systems are receiving increasing judicial attention. While there have been occasional missteps, the courts have demonstrated a sensitivity to the problems posed by electronically stored evidence.
With further experience, resolution of the problems posed by electronically
stored evidence should not impose any unusual burden on the courts. As discussed above, ample precedent exists to guide counsel and the court through
the seemingly intractable "silicon maze."

175. Id.
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